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The prospect of a referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union was a
recurring theme in 2012. Ahead of David Cameron’s speech on Europe, Iain Begg
assessed recent developments on Britain’s future relationship with Europe. He argues that
current trends are making a British exit from the EU more likely, and that even if the country
maintains EU membership, its relationship with other member states will be far from
straightforward. 
When Prime Minster David Cameron f lounced out of  the December 2011 European
Council meeting that paved the way f or the Fiscal Compact, lett ing all the world know that he had used
his veto, a line was crossed in the UK’s relationship with the EU. Instead of  being an awkward customer,
constantly complaining about the quality of  what was on of f er, but still coming back f or more, it now
looks conceivable that the UK will take its trade elsewhere. Af ter months of  speculation about a ‘Grexit ’
(a departure of  Greece f rom the euro) the expression now on many commentators’ lips is ‘Brexit ’.
There are many reasons f or this speculation. Although Cameron has robustly dismissed moves by his
more euro-sceptical MPs to f orce a ref erendum on the EU and to t ie his hands on negotiating the EU
budget, the issue of  EU membership is now very much a live one in Brit ish polit ics and it looks
increasingly likely that a ref erendum on whether the UK should remain part of  the EU will be held during
the next parliament. If  so, and bearing in mind the of ten quixotic nature of  a ref erendum as a polit ical
mechanism, a ‘no’ vote is not unlikely.
The United Kingdom has always been a reluctant European,
ref lecting not only its history, the f act that it is an island state
and its af f inity with the other English speaking nations, but also
a dif f erent vision of  European Union. For the UK, the economic
dimension of  EU membership has nearly always been more
prominent than the polit ical goals that were paramount f or the
post-war leaders of  France and Germany, who saw peace as the
core objective.
The high point of  UK membership of  the EU came with the
establishment of  the single market programme in the late 1980s,
a dimension of  European integration that continues to be what
Britain values most. Monetary union, by contrast, was always
considered as being a transf er of  competence too f ar f or Britain
to accept. Today, the UK decision to stay out of  the euro is
generally accepted as having been wise and prescient. In f act
when journalists or polit icians f rom other countries ask when
Britain might join the euro, the response f rom even the most
pro-European of  Brits is amusement that such a dumb question
should be posed.
As the euro area has slowly come to grips with its succession of
crises, the UK stance has been to call f or deeper f iscal and
polit ical integration, banking union, and polit ical leadership, but
without Brit ish participation. As David Cameron explained at a meeting in Berlin in June 2012, ‘I can
understand why eurozone countries may want to look at elements of  banking union’, but he went on to
say that ‘because we are not in the single currency, we won’t take part in the prof ound elements of  that
banking union’. At the December 2012 European Council meeting Cameron duly obtained the let-out he
wanted.
However, there is a cost: Brit ish advice f rom the side- lines is delivered in a tone that is leading to
increasing exasperation among other EU leaders. Even natural allies of  the UK, such as Sweden and
Poland, are losing patience and barbed comments have apparently been made by leaders such as Angela
Merkel. More generally, other leaders are starting to consider an EU without Britain.
Several recent developments accentuate the drif t towards separation, even bef ore Cameron makes his
much-trailed (and postponed) speech on the f uture relationship with the EU. In 2011, the coalit ion
government passed the European Union Act 2011  which will mean that any f uture transf er of  power to
the EU will be subject to approval by ref erendum. In the present polit ical climate, it is hard to see how
such a ref erendum could be won unless it is on something of  overwhelming interest to the UK. In July
2012, Foreign Secretary William Hague launched what has been described as an audit of  Britain’s
relationship with the EU. The ‘Review of  Competences between the United Kingdom and the European
Union’ will be a comprehensive examination of  what the EU does and why, and is expected to result in
wide-ranging proposals f or a recalibration of  the relationship. Home Secretary Theresa May has
announced that she will exercise an opt-out on crime, policing and justice, even though many of  the
measures are in tune with government policy. The unf inished negotiation of  the EU budget has the
potential to stoke the f lames, and so on.
The government has also talked (albeit vaguely) about renegotiating the terms of  UK membership of  the
EU and (still more vaguely) about subjecting the outcome of  this renegotiation to a ref erendum. Hague
claims to detect a growing disenchantment with the EU in Britain, and observes that ‘people f eel that in
too many ways the EU is something that is done to them, not something over which they have a say’.
All these developments suggest that it will become increasingly more dif f icult to reconcile UK
exceptionalism with the desire of  other Member States to deepen integration. In the past, the UK has
been accommodated by opt-outs (e.g. monetary union), resorting to protocols rather than f ull Treaty
articles, long delays or other means of  allowing the UK to articulate its resistance. Such approaches
solve the immediate problem, but at the expense of  complicating arrangements and leaving behind
uncomf ortable precedents. Even the rebate on the payment into the EU budget negotiated by Mrs
Thatcher in 1984 is an ad hoc device which, although permanent in the sense that it stays until Britain
agrees to f orgo it, has since led to an increasingly messy system f or f unding EU spending.
For the UK, the diversity of  national views on European integration has to be respected with the
implication that there can be dif f erent degrees of  union. But f or others it is becoming increasingly hard to
accept that proposals endorsed by everyone else can be blocked or delayed by just one Member State.
The question now is whether an EU of  variable geometry will be acceptable or whether Britain is now on
an inexorable route out of  the Union. It is a question without easy answers.
Three scenarios can be envisaged f or the UK. The f irst is that the UK leaves the EU and establishes a
looser connection similar to those of  Norway or Switzerland. A second would be f or the UK to remain
inside the EU, but to have a long-term agreement to stand apart f rom the deeper integration that others
now appear to want. The third would be a much more posit ive engagement with the closer integration
that is emerging.
Of  these, the third currently has no obvious source of  polit ical support. Quite simply, a polit ical party that
argued f or more ‘Brussels’ would be unappealing to voters. The f ew strongly pro-Europeans who
occasionally advocate closer integration are very much in the minority and have no real inf luence on
public debate. By contrast, the euro-sceptics who would be happier to see Britain out of  the EU have a
substantial polit ical base in the Conservative party and the UK Independence Party (UKIP). Indeed, the
consensus is that a majority of  the new Conservative MPs who entered Parliament f or the f irst t ime in
2010 are euro-sceptical, as are several of  the leading cabinet ministers.
It f ollows that there is undoubted polit ical support f or a withdrawal scenario. What is less clear is what a
UK divorce f rom Europe would mean. Britain would want to retain its access to the European market and
UK divorce f rom Europe would mean. Britain would want to retain its access to the European market and
to ensure that it was able to inf luence the development of  the rules governing that market. But more
sober commentators worry that leaving the Union entirely would leave Britain exposed to plots to slant
the market against its interest.
A similar worry arises in connection with the scenario of  continuing, but incomplete membership. The
skirmishes around the agreement of  the f iscal compact and the proposals f or banking union have shown
that Britain already struggles to f ind compromises acceptable to its partners who are becoming
increasingly reluctant to vary the geometry even more. Although all of  this is consistent with the Lisbon
treaty, it makes f or an increasingly uncomf ortable posit ion.
A working assumption has to be that the deepening of  the eurozone is going to continue, with at least
some f orm of  banking and f iscal union being constructed, possibly including moves towards a separate
eurozone budget and mutualisation of  debt. It is inconceivable that the UK would participate. If  so, the
UK’s detachment may have reached the point at which the debate ceases to be about what f urther
dif f erentiation can be achieved. Instead, as the list of  issues on which the UK seeks special terms
lengthens, the debate may shif t to be about whether the other Member States will tolerate a member that
wants to be so dif f erent. In other words, the ‘in but detached’ scenario may cease to be a choice f or
Britain; instead others may lose patience and oblige the UK to state whether it wants to be much more
comprehensively in or out. 
The obvious conclusion to draw is that the conjunction of  growing euro-scepticism domestically and the
perception elsewhere that the EU is being held back by the UK, must inexorably lead to the exit door.
Brit ish polit icians of  all the main parties could easily talk themselves into a ref erendum on EU
membership, some of  them thinking of  it as a way to reaf f irm a commitment to stay in, only to f ind that
the arguments f or a ‘no’ vote prevail.
Many in Britain would rejoice at such an outcome, but there are still many pragmatists who would f ind
such a prospect alarming and, though still tentative, there are signs of  a f ightback. Recent speeches by
Roger Carr (President of  the CBI), Tony Blair and Ed Miliband have articulated concerns. Europe remains
by f ar the biggest market f or UK exports and the web of  contracting links between companies across the
continent is dense and crucial to international competit iveness. It is not f or nothing that UK polit icians
ref er so of ten to the importance of  the single market.
The coalit ion government def ines itself  above all by the objectives of  sustainable economic recovery and
f iscal consolidation, and will not want to risk a divisive contest about Europe, especially if  it  leads to
tensions inside the two governing parties. Nevertheless, in the short- term there are bound to be f urther
dif f icult negotiations f or David Cameron around the EU budget, f ollowing the f ailure of  the November
23rd European Council to settle the matter, while the European Parliament elections in 2014 will probably
see a resurgence of  support f or UKIP.
Cameron will be under pressure to strike a f airly robust euro-sceptical stance in the 2015 election. He will
need to placate his core voters, f earing that they might otherwise consider UKIP or another f ringe party,
thereby making it more likely that he will lose parliamentary seats to the other main parties.
Looking ten years ahead, theref ore, Britain could well be out of  the European Union. Negotiating a
withdrawal and def ining the terms of  a new relationship will be a dif f icult task and not one that will
automatically be good f or the UK. Even if  the UK stays in, the relationship with its partners risks being
awkward and contrary. Either way, it will be a bumpy ride.
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